The 1917 February Revolution led to the reshaping of the war-era image of the German enemy. Focusing on the former imperial borderland province of the Southwestern Krai, this article unveils the national, political, and cultural considerations of the local Ukrainian and Russianlanguage media that affected their attitude towards the Germans. It argues that the developments of the 1917-1918 Ukrainian Revolution presented a unique case of constructing the image of the Germans due to the ongoing rivalry between the respective Ukrainian and Russian national projects. The study is based on the materials of prominent Kyivan daily newspapers, thus rendering the spectrum of the region's political thought. Built upon the concept of imagology, the article apprehends the images of "otherness" in conjunction with the actor's own identity.
Introduction
Throughout the First World War, the image of the ultimate German threat had served as a key instrument of the Russian Empire's mass mobilization and war effort. However, by the time the 1917 February Revolution broke out, this propaganda construct had already been overshadowed by general war weariness.1 The downfall of the Romanov dynasty brought to an end the country's rigid "war till victory" policy and thus shattered the uniform image of the enemy. Instead, various political actors acceding to power across the former empire had adopted their distinct attitudes towards belligerent Germany.2 In particular, this occurred in the Southwestern Krai where the Novosti, and Yuzhnaia Gazeta.8 Since these newspapers had been politically committed to the July 1917 Kyiv City Council elections, it is possible to deduce their potential audience from the result of that ballot.9 Out of the 307,000 individuals eligible in the general secret ballot, 174,000 participated in the elections.10 The Socialist Bloc (formed by the Russian leftists and supported by Kievskaia Mysl) gained 37% and the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party (Poslednie Novosti, Yuzhnaia Gazeta) additionally received 9%, the Ukrainian socialist parties gained 21%, the NonPartisan Alliance of Russian voters (supported by Kievlianin) gained 15% and the Bolsheviks -6% of the approval rate.11 As follows from the above data, the city itself remained a stronghold of Russian influence. As to the Ukrainian press, according to Oleksandr Mukomela its popularity rested upon the Ukrainian majority of the Krai.12 The study proceeds from Benedict Anderson's concept of a nation as an "imagined political community" and is built on the notion of imagology.13 Anderson emphasizes the principal role of a printed vernacular in the creation of a broad imagined community of native speakers. In particular, he credits the press for the dissemination of national ideas in 19th century Europe.14 Similarly to the Anderson's concept, imagology apprehends a written text as an instrument of national image construction. Dealing with the textual analysis of national representations, imagology addresses cross-national relations and seeks to uncover the image of the "other" in 8 On the history of the Kyivan press see: Anastasiia Volobuieva and Nataliia Sydorenko, Formuvannia presy Kyieva (1835 Kyieva ( -1918 As "Germany itself had been exhausted to the end," Nova Rada anticipated its reciprocity.20 The outbreak of Soviet Russia's aggression against the UNR in December of 1917 had only strengthened the anti-Bolshevik sentiments of the Ukrainian press. Nova Rada condemned the Bolsheviks' military invasion as an act of hypocrisy, rhetorically asking the Russian "brothers and comrades": "Do you perceive us, the democracy of Ukraine, as a more terrifying enemy than the hordes of General Hindenburg [German Field Marshal] themselves?!" 21 Indignant about the Russian Bolsheviks' war crimes in Ukraine, Nova Rada drew a parallel between these and the past atrocities of the German and Tsarist armies.22
The Russian-language press of Kyiv shared the Ukrainian media's strong dislike for the Bolshevik regime. Yet, the Russian newspapers generally neglected the Ukrainian UNR-centered stance and perceived the October Uprising from the all-Russian perspective. They claimed that the final defeat of Russia was the result of a German-Bolshevik conspiracy.23 Routinely depicting the underhanded German plotting, newspapers presented the Bolsheviks as the principal traitors, "puppets in the hands of the Germans." 24 Lev Voitolovskii was one of many commentators:
Here, in Russia, they are tearing off the epaullets from the officers, with whom they were once shedding blood for the integrity of the Russian borders; yet, in the occupied territories… where the sibilant whip is firmly squeezed in the hand of the German officer, they are silent and humble, bending their backs in front of the Prussian masters.25
Meanwhile, Kievlianin acknowledged Germany's victory over the Slavs as the product of the enemy's higher level of patriotic consciousness and the nation's unity.26 Kievlianin's Editorin-chief Vasilii Shulgin blamed apathetic Russian society and its "irresponsible" revolutionary leaders: "The self-sacrificing German patriots will be the rulers over the Russians, who had The allegedly German instigated Ukrainian question was another concern of the Russianlanguage press. Kievskaia Mysl dreaded enemy annexation of Russia's "Western Provinces" under the pretext of their national liberation.29 As Vasilii Rozanov argued, German imperialism aimed "to extrude Russia into Asia … to deprive her of European culture and political weight in the region." 30 Commenting on the separate peace negotiations, Konstantin Sukhovykh (Narodin) encouraged the Ukrainian Government to abstain from collaboration with the Germans.31 In turn, Shulgin forewarned the Ukrainians about the cunning German policy of divide et impera:
The Germans are fully aware that despite all their diabolic fraud over the foundation of "Independent" Ukraine, the close link between the latter and Russia, i. e. between the South-Russian and North-Russian states could be revived.32
For Shulgin the "fratricidal" Soviet-Ukrainian war was actually German intrigue, directed at Russia's dissolution.33 Kievlianin resisted the Ukrainian pro-German orientation by condemning the reccurence of "Mazepa's treason," intimidating Ukrainians with disastrous economic aftermaths and inevitable Allied retaliation.34 Shulgin proclaimed: One cannot expect good from the Ukrainians, with marks stuck to their hands… In the event of a German victory they together with the rest of the Slavs will languish miserably as slaves, but unlike the rest -with the brand of Cain on the brow.35
For the sake of salvation he urged Ukraine to become "the second righteous among nations" along with "Lot" -the Russian White movement's leader General Kaledin.36 However, on the eve of the Ukrainian -Central Powers' peace agreement Kievlianin acknowledged its failure. Shulgin depicted Ukrainians as "beloved German apprentices," who were eager to find themselves under the patronage of "the Berlin Eagle." 37 Despite this intermediate defeat, Kievlianin was confident in the final triumph of the anti-German coalition and the subsequent restoration of allied Russia.38
When on February 9, 1918 Ukraine signed a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, it was recognized as an independent nation and received military assistance in the war against the Bolsheviks. By concluding the treaty Germany sought to resolve its pressing food shortages at the expense of the Ukrainian surplus and, what is important, to undermine Russian hegemony in the region.39 Although the German interference had far-reaching consequences, in the spring of 1918 the allied Deutsches Heer played a crucial role in the repulsion of the Russian Bolsheviks and the renewal of the Ukrainian state.40 This foreign military support had drastically reshaped the attitude of the Kyivan press towards the Germans, marking a new era of mutual cooperation. The friendly image was reinforced by the German communiqués, typically pledging to assist Ukraine: "Our troops were summoned to help Ukraine in her up-hill struggle against the Great Russians…" 41 Ukrainian officials induced the population "to meet the German army easily and trustingly, to join it in the defense of one's own country against the Katsap furious and corrupt gangs!" 42 Since the recapture of Kyiv in March 1918 the Germans were praised as "allies" and "liberators," "clearing Ukraine" from the Russian-Bolshevik invaders.43 This proGerman orientation consolidated even further upon the information of the Entente's support for an indivisible Russia.44
In spite of the above mentioned positive changes, the image of the Germans remained ambiguous across the region and amongst different groups. Newspapers reported on the proRussian and pro-Bolshevik resistance in the South East of Ukraine.45 Nova Rada apprehended this as inertia of thinking -a result of deeply rooted imperial Germanophobia:
Citizens should finally subdue their war-built views and discern the German army the way it actually is -as a helper in the fight against the common enemy -the enemy, whom we could not overcome on our own.46
The Ukrainian countryside was initially anxious about "reactionery" German rule and the food requisitions.47 At the same time peasants were pleasantly astonished with the fact of "German-Ukrainian" cooperation.48 Well-to-do farmers soon credited the Germans with the 42 Katsap -a common Ukrainian pejorative term for the Great Russians (Russians). Plausibly, the term was coined from the "Kak Tsap" word combination, meaning "Like a Goat" and referring to the mocking Ukrainian stereotype of an average bearded Russian. However, member of the National establishment of a safe, "strict but just" order. Yet, the poor and anarchists remained ill-disposed and favored the Bolshevik style plunder of the "bourgeoisie." 49 Notably, Nova Rada supported the German police operations against such criminal gangs.50 The leader of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists and the former vice-president of the Central Rada, Serhii Yefremov, apprehended the German stay as a forced upon yet potentially beneficial model. He hoped that the Ukrainians would eventually adopt the German virtues of order and diligence.51 According to Yefremov, by the summer of 1918 the Germans had managed to win the hearts of the Ukrainian peasantry:
A German POW had appeared here for the first time in the spring of 1916 … Mostly he behaved with dignity and left behind not only good fame but also a great deal of romances. [Then came] the real German -carrying a rifle and an iron helmet, serious, self-possessed, disciplined… At first there were incidents when in response to the German provision requests, concerning let us say, "eggs," the peasants replied: "No Central Rada -no eggs." Now this is in the past… The Germans are purchasing and paying on a regular basis… They are supplied willingly, without requisitions. … One can see power in a German. Initially it seemed to be hostile; "defending the bourgeois, they say," yet it is increasingly appealing due to its inner correctness, self-control, discipline: this is just a well set operating mechanism… The Germans are stationed in the village for over a month -and not a single hen is missing, none of the window glass is broken, neither a drunken individual among them, nor bloody noses amongst the locals. Our lads are amazed… 52
Not all of the Ukrainian Central Rada's statesmen shared Yefremov's favorable attitude towards the Germans. As early as the end of March 1917 the Ukrainian Social Democrats acknowledged the threat of imperial Germany. Their party newspaper, Robitnycha Hazeta, was dissatisfied with plausible German economic domination and the infringement of the leftist movement in Ukraine.53 Member of the Central Rada and former minister of education, Ivan Steshenko, rhymed this concern: It should be noted though, that Robitnycha Hazeta's aversion towards "German imperialism" was actually limited to the "Prussian" ruling elite. On the contrary, the newspaper preserved a traditional sympathy for nation-wide "German democracy." 55 Overall, the newspapers perceived the Ukrainian Government's ineffectiveness as the primary cause of the German interference in the country's internal affairs. The media feared that the non-implementation of the peace treaty provisions concerning the food supply would lead to German military occupation.56 In the words of Nova Rada, the German army "would neither help nor befriend us on an empty stomach…" 57 The Russian-language press of Kyiv perceived the Germans from the standpoint of their primary goal -the restoration of a "one and indivisible Russia." For Kievlianin the February 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Ukraine -Central Powers) symbolized the start of the foreign German occupation. Yet, Shulgin welcomed the Germans with a grim irony, as a just retribution for the outrages of the revolutionaries:
It came strong, steady, confident… Counter-revolution came personified by the German officers and soldiers, who occupied Russia. … Counterrevolution is order, stable authority; it is the end to idleness, chatter, the end of the bullying and violence against the defenseless… The Germans Nova Rada, April 20, 1918, 2. brought this order at the point of their bayonets… in the first place restoring railroads, they ordered to sweep and perfectly clean our miserable Kyiv train station -the emblem of contemporary culture… Cleanness and tidiness! Is there a source ever more hostile to the crowned with dirt Russian Revolution? 58 However, the loyal to the Entente Kievlianin refused to collaborate with the "honest German enemy" and announced its closure.59 In April of 1918 its editorial staff organized another rightist newspaper, Golos Kieva. The Russian newspapers acknowledged the German army's support for the Ukrainian state.60 Still, they expressed gratitude to the Germans for their "courteous" treatment, and liberation from the Bolshevik terror.61 Aware of Germany's mercenary goals, the Russian press predicted the near end of the Ukrainian state project.62
The subsequent changes in attitude towards the Germans occurred in late April of 1918, following the forcible dissolution of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Instigated by the German military command, the Hetman's coup d'état had led to the de facto German military occupation of Ukraine.63 Consequently, this disrupted Ukraine's "German orientation." 64 Ex-member of the Central Rada and Nova Rada's Editor-in-chief Andrii Nikovskyi wrote:
When the German army came to Ukraine to help in the war against the Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian intellectuals and the conscious part of the people at first vaguely and then with a growing interest embraced the "German orientation" -the idea of the relations with Germany that could lead to 58 V. Shulgin, "Kiev, 24 fevralia (9-go marta) 1918 g. [Kyiv, February 24 (March 9), 1918] The Ukrainian newspapers accused the "reactionary German elite" of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty's violation and the usurpation of power under the mask of the Hetmanate.66 However, former Central Rada politicians refrained from military resistance and adopted the strategy of public protest.67 In the first place, the Ukrainian press acknowledged the government's incompetence and the overall nation's infantilism as the primary causes of the state's failure. Yet, there were other reasons to tolerate the German occupation. First, the German army remained the only force capable of defending Ukraine from permanent Russian Bolshevik invasion.68 Second, the alternative to the German defeat had been reckoned as an even greater disaster due to the pro-Russian stance of the Entente Powers.69 As a result, the Ukrainian media supported the pro-Ukrainian German political opposition in the Reichstag.70 Notably, it was the German Social Democrats and the party of the Center -who favored the creation of a strong Ukrainian state as a "forefront of Western civilization" against the Russian peril.71 Simultaneously, the Ukrainian press attempted to discourage the German Government from its support of the former imperial Russian elites in Ukraine.72 It forewarned Berlin that the Hetmanate authority consisted of pro-Russian elements, secretly hostile towards both the German Empire and Ukraine.73 On the contrary, the Russian-language press of Kyiv welcomed the Hetman's coup d'état as the precursor of Russia's revival. Golos Kieva was delighted with the German deposition of the Ukrainian Government.74 It anticipated the closure of the "nonviable" Ukrainian project and the subsequent "monarchial German" return to "traditional friendship with Petrograd." 75 The initial success of the German 1918 spring offensive on the Western front also prompted the emergence of the Russian Realpolitik based on "German orientation." 76 Lastly, the media valued the German army's protection against the Bolshevik threat. 77 Each of the national groups considered the victorious German state as an example to follow. Nova Rada advocated for the European civilizational choice as an alternative to forced Russification, іnstead of untidy impotent Moscow we want our external culture to match with the German, Romanic, and Anglo-Saxon cultures, we have had enough of the littered hut filled with fleas, we are longing for the space, air, light, and the conveniences of the white race… 78 envisioned the possibility to outbid them in the near future -"the same way the Prussians had once overcome Napoleonic France." 82 While the fact of the German occupation was officially negated, the daily news presented the opposite.83 The media discussed the "German order" -the consecutive measures of the German military administration, adopted to substitute the Hetman's authority and enforce the region's stability. For example, the German commandant's office in Kyiv introduced rules on automobile traffic, certified gun owners, and prohibited any unauthorized public meetings.84 The Germans also managed to normalize the bread market of Kyiv through control over bakeries.85 On the regional level they endeavored to restore the production capacity of enterprises -either by salary motivation or by the threat of force. 86 The press covered the German court-martial demonstration trials concerning the issues of larceny, felony, and sabotage. 87 By October of 1918 the Ukrainian media were still confident of Germany's invincibility.88 They perceived Berlin's peace offer as a goodwill gesture, designed to stop the bloodshed of the protracted conflict.89 As a result, the press managed to correctly assess the state of affairs only shortly before the Armistice.90 Its views of the November Revolution were ambivalent: while greeting the triumph of German Democracy, Nova Rada also empathized Germany's "tragic end of the war." 91 In particular, the Ukrainian right-wing politician Dmytro Dontsov condemned the Entente for the mistreatment of the defeated party. He predicted Germany's resurrection:
The Kaiser is only a temporary, though typical emanation of the German spirit. Deprived of one's head, Prussian "militarism," which has displayed such great moral strength and organizational ability in this war, -would not perish and certainly Germany would not revert to the times of Goethe and Schiller, to the times of its political lethargy… 92 Concerning Ukrainian affairs, Nova Rada retrospectively blamed the German Junkers and the generals for their cooperation with the Russian "enemies of Ukrainian statehood." 93 Nevertheless, the newspaper hoped for the preservation of a strong democratic German state as a strategic ally of Ukraine. 94 The Russian-language press of Kyiv celebrated the forthcoming victory of the Allied Powers, interpreting it as the end of the German "Brest yoke" period of Russian history.95 Golos Kieva rejoiced over the failure of Germany's "World Hegemony" and expected the near death of the "favorite child of the German imperialism -Ukrainian independence." 96 Professor Aleksandr Pogodin wrote:
Our fathers had outlived the foundation of the German Empire, we observe its downfall. … The New Grunwald [allusion to the battle of Grunwald] is destroying all those ephemeral state entities, which were created on the basis of the presently annulled Brest treaty. Admittedly, the Germans themselves were at a loss at what to do with these "states," so that emerging Lithuania, the Baltic and Finnish states, not to mention Ukraine, disturbed them significantly. Their restitution to the bosom of a single Russia is indispensable… 97 
